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BIANNUAL 'SURVEY
With the above statements as defendant's evidence, the court
proceeded to define the different types of verdicts. The most
common of the illegal verdicts is the "compromise verdict." This is
a verdict arrived at when a juror surrenders a conscientious con-
viction on one material issue in return for the relinquishment by
another juror of his conscientious conviction on another issue.
The court was quick to point out that jurors may give weight
to the opinions of other jurors and reasonable concessions may be
made. Thus, to set aside a verdict as being one of compromise,
it must appear that a conscientious conviction was sacrificed. The
compromise verdict may be detected by the fact that a given
verdict cannot be found consistent with any version of the
proof.
The decision then proceeded to distinguish the "quotient
verdict," which is illegal, from a legal verdict arrived at by
averaging. The "quotient verdict" results from an agreement pur-
suant to which each juror writes down the amount of damages
he would award and the twelve figures are averaged to arrive
at the amount of damages. The fact that each juror discloses his
own figure as to damages does not in and of itself make the
verdict illegal. The essential element of the illegality of the
"quotient verdict" is the prior agreement to be bound by the
result of the computation. 225
Having defined these concepts, the court held that the verdict
here was not shown to have been arrived at by an illegal method.
The presumption is that no illegal arrangements were made and
therefore the party attempting to overturn a verdict must affirma-
tively show that it was arrived at by improper means.2 26 Herein
lies the difficulty for the practitioner. How does one sustain the
burden of proof in this instance? "It is well settled that a juror
is not competent to impeach his verdict . .. -227 Therefore,
proof must be given by someone other than a juror. The court,
sustaining the verdict at bar, did not have occasion to investigate
the difficult questions of proof invariably attendant upon overturning
a verdict on the basis of something that occurred in the jury
room.
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
Contempt of court for disobedience of article 52 subpoena.
In James v. Powell 228 an interesting contention was made by
the contemnor's attorney. Defendant-contemnor is a rather re-
22
5 Id. at 5, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
2 2
0 Id. at 6, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 303.227 PRiNc, RICHARDSON ON EViDEICE § 423 (9th ed. 1964).
22843 Misc. 2d 314, 250 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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sourceful judgment debtor, upon whom a subpoena duces tecum
was served. Defendant Powell did not appear on the date specified
therein and the plaintiff moved to punish him for contempt.229
The supreme court granted plaintiff's motion and the order provided
that the defendant could purge himself of his contempt by paying
the entire judgment or by appearing for examination on a new
date. Defendant appealed from the contempt order, and this
appeal was subsequently suspended by stipulation of the parties
pending the disposition of the appeal from the judgment itself
in the appellate division. The stipulation provided, in part, that
defendant would appear for an examination if the judgment was
affirmed, entirely or conditionally.
The judgment was conditionally affirmed (for a lesser amount)
and the defendant failed to appear for examination on the date fixed
by the court. Plaintiff then applied for an order of arrest of
defendant based on the contempt order granted by the court prior
to the stipulation of the parties.
Defendant contended that the contempt order related to a
"prior judgment" which had, in effect, been extinguished, and
that a new judgment was now in existence as a result of the
conditional affirmance by the appellate division. Defendant further
contended that the motion to arrest was premature under Section
5251 of the CPLR 230 and that plaintiff had to start enforcement
proceedings anew on the "new" judgment.
Mr. Justice Chimera disposed of the above arguments by
stating:
The contempt order . . . does not relate to a prior judgment. There is
only one judgment in this case. A modification on appeal does not constitute
a second judgment. Plaintiff's instant application relates to the [original]
contempt order .. .231
The case stands for the proposition that a modification of ajudgment on appeal does not constitute a new or so-called second
judgment.
Contempt is not available to punish a defendant simply for
failure to pay a money judgment.3 2 It is available, however,
when contemptuous conduct appears in the course of enforcing it.2 33
In the case of Matter of Reeves,2" the court of appeals upheld a
229 CPLR 5251 provides in part that: "Failure of any person to comply
with a subpoena . . . shall . . . be punishable as a contempt of court."
23o Ibid.231 James v. Powell, 43 Misc. 2d 314, -, 250 N.Y.S.2d 635, 640 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).
232 CPLR 5104.
233 Supra note 229.
.234 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E.2d 283 (1937).
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finding of contempt on the ground that the judgment debtor was
punished because of his disrespect and disobedience of a court
order and not because he was unable to pay the judgment.
CPLR 5221: Enforcement procedures connected with surrogate's
court decrees must be brought in supreme or county court.
In In re Finkelstein's Estate,23 5 an order was moved for
directing a bank to release certain funds from an estate account.
The bank argued that it could not release the money because a
judgment creditor of the decedent had served a subpoena 23 6 on it,
which subpoena restrained it from paying out the money except
(among other things) by court order. The question arose as
to where such an order must be sought. It was sought here
in the surrogate's court. The court denied the motion on the
ground that the motion had to be made in the supreme or a
county court.
The reason lies in CPLR 5221. That section provides, in
subdivision (b), that all motions under article 52 must be made
in a court specified in subdivision (a). The latter provides, in
effect, that proceedings by way of enforcement of surrogate's
court decrees must be instituted in supreme or a county court.237
Hence, the instant application had to be made to the latter
court.
The practitioner should note these phenomena connected with
the enforcement of judgments. While proceedings to enforce ajudgment of the supreme and county courts, and certain other
courts specified in CPLR 5221 (a), may be brought in the same
court which rendered the judgment, that is not so of the surrogate's
court or of most of the state's lower courts. As to them, the
enforcement procedures (other than mere execution) must be
brought in the supreme or county court.23 8
23543 Misc. 2d 820, 252 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Surr. Ct. 1964).
236 Under the CPLR, the subpoena would be governed by CPLR 5223 and
5224, and would not effect a restraint. The restraint would be effected by the
service of a restraining notice under CPLR 5222, a device entirely distinct
from the subpoena under the CPLR. Under prior law, it was the subpoena
which itself contained a restraint, and it was apparently that kind of
subpoena which was used, perhaps erroneously, in the instant case. The matter
is not of moment; the court treated the subpoena as if it were also a
restraining notice under CPLR 5222 and disoosed of the case accordingly.
237 The surrogate's court and proceedings in enforcement of its decrees
are governed by paragraph 3 of CPLR 5221(a).23sThe lower courts which may entertain enforcement proceedings in con-
nection with their own judgments are listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of CPLR
5221(a). All other courts fall within paragraph 3 of that provision, and
hence enforcement of their judgments must be sought in the supreme or a
county court.
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